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CAUGHT IN THE TRANSITION:
A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES
by

Elizabeth A. Marcuccio*
Matina Mouyos**
I.

INTRODUCTION

After the Supreme Court’s decision legalizing same-sex
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges1, one would believe that the
disparity in the treatment of same-sex versus opposite-sex
couples under the law would cease. Yet a series of decisions by
New York state courts examining the rights of same-sex
couples after the end of their relationships have had unforeseen
consequences. These decisions have impacted the areas of
estate planning, equitable distribution of property, and parental
rights relating to the custody and visitation of the couple’s
children.
The purpose of this article is to analyze these court
rulings and provide guidance to avoid both unexpected and
unintended outcomes.
_________________________________________
* Professor of Business Law, Siena College, Loudonville, New
York
** Student, Siena College, Loudonville, New York
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II.

BEQUESTS TO FORMER SPOUSES

New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) §51.4 states that, unless the will expressly states otherwise, a
divorce, judicial separation, or annulment of a marriage
revokes all dispositions or appointments made by a decedent to
a former spouse. The former spouse is treated as having
predeceased the testator. This means any bequests to the former
spouse, the nomination of the former spouse as executor or
trustee, and any appointments of property in the former
spouse’s favor under a power of appointment are revoked.
The revocation is valid even if the will was executed before
the marriage.2 In addition, the former spouse’s rights to
“in-trust-for” bank accounts (Totten Trusts), life insurance
policies, lifetime revocable trusts, and joint tenancies with right
of survivorship are also revoked.3
Matter of Leyton4 involves a petition by the decedent’s
mother and sister to revoke letters testamentary issued to the
decedent’s former same-sex partner naming him as executor,
and to disqualify him as a beneficiary under the will. The
decedent and his former partner had entered into a commitment
ceremony in New York in 2002, but later separated in 2008.
The will was executed on January 11, 2001, prior to the
commitment ceremony.5 If the decedent and his partner had
married and then divorced, EPTL §5-1.4 would have barred his
former partner from serving as executor and from inheriting
under the will. When the Bennett Commission first reviewed
this issue in the 1960s, it found it counterintuitive that any
testator would provide a gift to a former spouse, and the
Legislature agreed.6 In their petition, the decedent’s mother
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and sister contended that the former partner was the equivalent
of a former spouse, and therefore should be disqualified under
the statute.
The petitioners argued that the State of New York
“wrongfully and unconstitutionally deprived decedent and his
partner the right to marry and subsequently divorce.”
Therefore, the Surrogate’s Court, “as a matter of right and
equity” should apply the statutory provisions of EPTL §5-1.4.7
Conversely, the former partner argued that at the time of the
commitment ceremony, the union was not considered a formal
marriage in New York State, and the subsequent break-up was
not a “separation,” “abandonment” or “divorce” as defined by
the statute.8
The Surrogate noted that the petitioners were asking the
Court to retroactively apply New York’s Marriage Equity Act,
which did not legalize same-sex marriage until 2011. The
Court further stated that it is up to the Legislature to decide
questions such as this, concluding, “this Court cannot deem the
commitment ceremony to have sanctified a marriage,” thereby
allowing the decedent and his former partner to be deemed
divorced.”9 Even after 2011 the decedent and his former
partner took no steps to obtain a judicial decree declaring an
end to their union. The petition was denied.
While the Court’s decision appears to deny the
presumed intent of the decedent, this may not true. The
decedent died in December 2013 of a heart attack at the age of
52. This was more than five years after the decedent and his
former partner had ended their relationship. The couple had
been together approximately 10 years prior to their
commitment ceremony, and separated six years after the
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ceremony, resulting in a 16-year relationship. They stayed on
good terms after their separation; they continued to co-own
property, bank accounts and credit cards up until the decedent’s
death. Early in 2013, the decedent attended his former partner’s
wedding when he married another man, and the decedent acted
as the wedding’s sole official witness.10
The decedent had ample time and opportunity to
execute a new will after the romantic relationship between the
parties ended, but did not. While the Court’s ruling appears to
support the decedent’s wishes in this case, the opposite may be
true in future cases. It is imperative that same-sex couples who
never legally marry, then later separate, review and update
their estate plans. They cannot rely on the language of EPTL
§5-1.4 to revoke all bequests to a former loved one. Only by
revising their documents can they be certain that their true
wishes will be carried out.

III.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY

Equitable distribution is the means by which New York
allocates marital property between the spouses when a
marriage ends. New York’s Domestic Relations Law provides
that equitable distribution of marital property shall be made in
a court action where all or part of the relief granted is a
divorce, or upon the dissolution, annulment or declaration of
the nullity of a void marriage.11 This provision authorizes the
court to equitably distribute marital property only when the
marital relationship is terminated. Absent such a change in
marital status, the court is powerless to distribute marital
property.
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The term "marital property" is defined as all property
acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and
before the execution of a separation agreement or the
commencement of a divorce action, regardless of the form in
which title is held.12 Excluded from marital property is separate
property, which includes property acquired before the marriage
or property acquired by bequest, devise, descent or gift from a
third party to one of the spouses.13
O’Reilly-Morshead v. O’Reilly-Morshead14 involves a
same-sex couple who began their relationship in 2001. In 2002
the couple moved to New York, but before relocating the
defendant sold a house that she owned in her own name in
Indiana. In June, 2003, the couple entered into a civil union in
Vermont. Under the Vermont civil union statute the parties
acquired rights, under Vermont law, in property they acquired
thereafter.15 In 2004 the plaintiff purchased a home in New
York, which she purchased with her separate property; the
defendant was not listed on the deed to the property. In 2006
the couple was married in Canada, and five years later the
plaintiff commenced a divorce action in New York seeking
equitable distribution of the marital property. The defendant
then filed an action for divorce and a counterclaim for
dissolution of the civil union, asking the New York court to
distribute any “civil union property” under Vermont law.16
At controversy is whether either or both of the parties
attained legal rights to property acquired by the other party in
her own name after the date of the civil union, but before the
date of the marriage. At the time of the parties’ civil union,
Vermont’s civil union statute granted couples entering a civil
union the same property rights as those extended to couples
entering a marriage.17 Nevertheless at the time these parties
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entered into their civil union, Vermont did not recognize their
union as a legal marriage. In 2009 Vermont passed a Marriage
Equality Act which afforded legal status to same-sex
marriages.18 This Act defines marriage, stating that it includes
all "legally recognized unions of two people." Therefore
marriages and civil unions, after the Marriage Equality Act, are
equivalent unions that can be dissolved by the Vermont courts.
To further clarify property rights, the Vermont Supreme Court
has intoned that even if joined in a civil union, the property
acquired by the parties during the civil union is subject to court
distribution, and is referred to as the "marital estate"19
While it is clear that Vermont courts have the authority
to dissolve the couples’ civil union and subsequent marriage, as
well as distribute all property acquired by them after the date of
their civil union, do New York courts have jurisdiction to do
the same? Appeals courts in New York state have held that trial
courts can dissolve civil unions under a trial court's general
equity jurisdiction.20 Nevertheless, while authorizing New
York courts to dissolve civil unions, no guidance was provided
regarding the distribution of property acquired during the
course of the civil union.21 The court in O’Reilly-Morshead had
to decide whether it could distribute "civil union property" that
is outside the scope of "marital property" as defined in the
Domestic Relations Law. The mere fact that the court has the
power to dissolve the civil union does not dictate that it must
apply New York's statutory rules to relief under the
dissolution.22 In that respect, it is important to note that other
New York courts have concluded that a civil union is not the
equivalent of a marriage in New York.23 Furthermore the Third
Department declined to apply comity and extend New York's
system of benefits to a civil union partner stating,
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While parties to a civil union may be
spouses, and even legal spouses, in
Vermont, New York is not required to
extend to such parties all of the benefits
extended to marital spouses. The
extension
of
benefits
entails
a
consideration of social and fiscal policy
more
appropriately
left
to
the
24
Legislature.
The court in O’Reilly-Morshead ruled that there was no
indication from the legislature or the Court of Appeals that the
definition of marital property, which is subject to distribution
in New York divorce actions, could be so easily relinquished to
other states. This would cause the situs of the marriage, rather
than that of divorce, to carry more weight, and the court
refused to adopt Vermont’s definition of marital property or the
marital estate.25
A second argument made by the defendant is that a civil
union is an “express contract” similar to the marriage contract.
As a matter of contract law, the union is subject to termination
by a court of general equity, and the court must decide whether
to utilize New York or Vermont law as the basis for developing
a remedy after termination of the agreement. While the court
acknowledged the persuasiveness of this argument, it declined
to accept it, stating,
The failure of the legislature to recognize
"civil unions" and the strict definition of
"marital property" as the starting point for
considering equitable distribution of
property prohibit this court from venturing
to that conclusion. There is no general
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common law of equity that is equivalent
to the statutory creation of an equitable
distribution power in the Domestic
Relations Law. Equitable distribution of
property from a titled party to a non-titled
party is only permitted in New York if the
parties are married, either under the laws
of New York, or other states or nations.
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly
noted that a "marriage"—of whatever type
or from whatever jurisdiction—is the only
touchstone for equitable distribution of
property in New York.26
The Court’s decision in this case appears to be an
anomaly; it dissolves a preexisting civil union, but only allows
equitable property distribution based upon the date of the
couple’s legal marriage. Some states recognize civil unions as
the equivalent of a legal marriage, providing the parties with
the same legal rights and responsibilities of a married couple.
However, this case serves as a caution to same-sex couples:
The jurisdiction in which they entered a civil union may not
serve as the controlling law when they wish to terminate their
relationship. When seeking court-ordered distribution of civil
union property, it is the law of the state granting the dissolution
that controls. These couples, while on good terms, may wish to
sign an express contract addressing the distribution of civil
union property in the event their relationship terminates in the
future.

IV.

PARENTAL RIGHTS

In New York state, it has long been presumed that a
child born of a married woman is the child of the husband. The
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presumption is recognized at common law27 and codified in
New York statutes.28 Both New York’s Domestic Relations
Law and Family Court Act establish that a child born before or
after the marriage shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of
the married couple. This is true whether or not the marriage
was valid.
Kelly S. v. Farah M.29 involves a same-sex couple that
began their relationship in March 2000. They entered into a
registered domestic partnership in California in January 2004,
and shortly thereafter decided to start a family. Anthony S., a
close friend of both of the parties, agreed to donate his sperm,
and Kelly S. became pregnant through artificial insemination.
In January 2005, Kelly S. gave birth to I.S., who was legally
adopted by Farah M. and is not a subject of this case.
The parties decided to have another child, and Anthony
S. again agreed to donate his sperm. This time Farah M.
became pregnant by artificial insemination and gave birth to
Z.S. on March 24, 2007. The parties were legally married in
August 2008 when California first allowed same-sex
marriages. That same year they decided to have a third child,
and Farah M. became pregnant once more through artificial
insemination, with Anthony S. again donating the sperm. Farah
M. gave birth to E.S. on April 27, 2009. Both Z.S. and E.S.
were given Kelly S.'s surname, and Kelly S. was listed as a
parent on the children's birth certificates. In conceiving Z.S.
and E.S. the artificial insemination procedure was performed at
home by Farah M., rather than by a physician, and the parties
did not draft or sign a written consent agreement. Kelly S. did
not legally adopt Z.S. or E.S.30
In 2012 the parties relocated with the children to New
York. Subsequently the parties separated, and Kelly S. moved
to Arizona in the summer of 2013, while Farah M. remained in
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New York with the three children. In May 2014 Kelly S. filed a
visitation petition in the Family Court in Suffolk County, New
York, seeking visitation with Z.S. and E.S. The petition alleged
that Kelly S. was the mother of the subject children and stated
the facts set forth above. The petition further alleged that Kelly
S. helped raise the children until the parties separated.31 In
determining parentage the first issue that the court had to
decide was whether to use New York or California law. After
discussing the doctrine of comity,32 the court determined that
the parties' decade long history and residence in California
warranted the application of California law to this matter.
Turning to the facts of this case, the court noted that the
parties did not comply with the artificial insemination laws of
either California or New York. Therefore, those statutes did not
provide a basis for treating Kelly S. as a parent. Nevertheless,
after analyzing the presumption of parentage arising under
California law for children born of a marriage,33 as well as the
California law for registered domestic partnerships,34 the court
determined that when Z.S. was born in 2007, while the parties
were living together in a registered domestic partnership,
California law afforded them the same rights and obligations
with respect to Z.S. as if they were married spouses. The court
concluded that Kelly S. was presumed to be the parent of both
Z.S. and E.S. under California law.35
At first glance this case appears to create new law in
New York, doing away with New York’s previous holding in
Matter of Paczkowski v. Paczkowski,36 which concluded a nonbiological mother does not have standing to seek custody or
visitation. In Paczkowski the court held that the presumption of
parentage does not arise for the non-gestational spouse in a
same-sex marriage because there is no possibility that she is the
child’s biological parent. While it may be an indication of
intent to be a parent, as would a non-biological parent’s name
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on a birth certificate, it does not create a legal parent-child
relationship.
While it is true that many states have a “martial
presumption of parentage,” it is applied differently by the
states. In New York, the marital presumption of parentage does
not apply to same-sex couples. Therefore, had Kelly S. and
Farah M. lived in New York, and conceived and given birth to
their children in New York, the outcome of this case would
have been vastly different. Kelly S. would have been denied
visitation to the children she had helped to raise since their
birth. Same-sex families be cautioned: Adoption is the only
way to create a legal parent-child relationship that must be
recognized in every state.

V.

CONCLUSION

Marriage is a vital package of legal rights and
responsibilities. Prior to our nation legalizing same-sex
marriage, many states permitted same-sex couples to take part
in commitment ceremonies or enter civil unions or registered
domestic partnerships. These “marriage substitutes” do not
afford the parties the same rights and responsibilities of a legal
marriage, and may result in unforeseen consequences when a
couple seeks to dissolve their relationship. It is time for states
to pass legislation to mitigate these unexpected and unintended
outcomes.
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